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Abstract: Changes in the legislative framework in response to 
terrorist threats in Malaysia, India and the United Kingdom since 
the 9/11 attacks have witnessed the integration of national security 
issues and criminal justice to form part of the extraordinary security 
laws passed by the authorities. This integration has rested on the 
premise that terrorism is an unprecedented threat and so it requires 
legislation tailored to what has been called as a ‘new paradigm in 
prevention. The criminal law has largely, though not exclusively, 
focused only on dealing with crimes that have already taken 
place. However, the reason for the shift in states emphasis towards 
prevention in counter-terrorism is that terrorism is an extraordinary 
threat that calls for a special response. A unique theme of most 
anti-terror legislations is focusing on what is referred to by the 
government as ‘prevention’ - hoping to foil foreseeable attacks from 
the terrorists. However, the key concern is the impact on the Rule of 
Law values when applying the anti-terror laws. This article argues 
that the preventive methods adopted by Malaysia, India and the 
United Kingdom are effective in forestalling terrorist activities to 
a certain extent, but often this comes at a high price to pay when 
individual human rights are sacrificed along the way. Further, anti-
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terror legislation has degraded the Rule of Law values in response 
to terrorism threat or national security. 
Keywords: Rule of Law, Terrorism; National security; Preventive 
detention; POTA 2015.
Abstrak: Perubahan dalam struktur perundangan sebagai tindak 
balas kepada ancaman keganasan di negara seperti Malaysia, 
India dan United Kingdom selepas serangan 9/11 menyaksikan 
isu keselamatan negara dan undang-undang jenayah telah 
diintegrasikan untuk membentuk satu undang-undang keselamatan 
baharu yang agak luar biasa yang diiktiraf oleh pihak berkuasa. 
Integrasi ini berlandaskan premis bahawa keganasan ialah satu 
ancaman yang dipandang serius dan memerlukan undang-undang 
yang bersesuaian untuk membendungnya yang dirujuk sebagai satu 
‘paradigma baharu pencegahan’. Pada lazimnya, undang-undang 
jenayah hanya tertumpu kepada menangani jenayah yang telah 
berlaku dan tidak memberi tumpuan kepada jenayah yang bakal 
dilakukan oleh pengganas. Oleh sebab itu, satu perubahan telah 
dilihat apabila penekanan terhadap pencegahan dalam membendung 
keganasan oleh negara-negara yang dikaji adalah kerana keganasan 
dianggap sebagai ancaman luar biasa dan memerlukan tindak 
balas khas. Dalam undang-undang antikeganasan, tema unik yang 
diberi perhatian oleh kerajaan adalah kepada langkah pencegahan 
– dengan harapan ia dapat mematahkan cubaan serangan 
yang dirancang oleh pihak pengganas. Walau bagaimanapun, 
keprihatinan utama ialah kesan ke atas peraturan Undang-undang 
apabila undang-undang antikeganasan dilaksanakan. Artikel ini 
berpendapat bahawa kaedah pencegahan yang diterima pakai 
oleh negara seperti Malaysia, India dan United Kingdom berkesan 
dalam menghalang kegiatan pengganas pada tahap tertentu, tetapi 
malangnya selalu melibatkan pengorbanan hak asasi individu. 
Tambahan pula, undang-undang antikeganasan telah menggugat 
nilai-nilai peraturan undang-undang susulan daripada tindak balas 
yang diambil terhadap ancaman daripada keganasan atau untuk 
keselamatan negara.
Kata Kunci: Peraturan undang-undang; Keganasan; Keselamatan 




The Rule of Law is inherently a debatable theory. It implies different 
things to different people and brings forth a vast array of political 
agendas. Raz’s narrative of the Rule of Law is, thus far, the most 
influential in modern times. Raz describes “the basic intuition” 
underlying the principle of the Rule of Law to be: “the law must 
be able to regulate the conduct of its subjects.”1 According to Raz, 
the law must be “prospective, general, clear, public, and relatively 
stable.” Besides that, Raz also included an independent judiciary and 
fair hearings without bias, which are the primary focus of this article. 
Predominantly, the Rule of Law is concerned about constitutional 
liberty. However, the Malaysian anti-terror law such as the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act, 2015 (POTA 2015) seems to disregard all the ideals 
of the Rule of Law.
Before embarking on discussing the operation and the challenges 
of anti-terror legislation in Malaysia, and whether the laws degrade 
the Rule of Law values or not, it is essential to explore the historical 
aspects of the security laws enacted prior to the latest anti-terror law 
vis-a-vis the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2015 (‘POTA 2015’). In 
Malaysia, the state of emergency was declared on 31 July 1960 by 
introducing the preventive detention regime under the now repealed 
Act known as the Internal Security Act, 1960 (‘ISA 1960’). Although 
the government subdued the state of emergency, the preventive 
detention regime under ISA 1960 was maintained by the authority 
as a potent tool against internal security threats subsequently. With 
ISA 1960, the government continued to enjoy powers to detain 
persons assessed as harmful to the national security of Malaysia, 
with somewhat broad powers to curb the freedom of expression, 
association, and the press. When the late Tun Abdul Razak, the then 
Deputy Prime Minister presented the ISA Bill in the Parliament, he 
said this, “Let me make it quite clear that it is no pleasure for the 
Government to order the detention of any person. Nor will these 
powers be abused.” 2 (Emphasis added) However, during the 52 years 
when ISA 1960 was in force, the government systematically turned the 
law to suppress political dissent. In the early 1980s, Prime Minister, 
1 Raz, J. (1979). The authority of law (1st ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press., p. 
214.
2 Parliamentary Debates, Dewan Rakyat (21.6.1960), at p. 1189
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Mahathir Mohammad, expressed his view of ISA 1960 shortly after 
he took over the post. At that time, the public hoped that the use of 
preventive detention orders would diminish under the leadership of 
Mahathir. However, political trouble in 1987 saw another revival of 
these preventive detention measures which were extensively applied 
by the government as reliable measures to suppress political protests. 
In October 1987, the police arrested 106 people in the infamous 
“Operation Lalang”, comprising prominent leaders and opposition 
lawmakers, who were jailed without charge under ISA 1960.3 
In 2001, a High Court judge recommended the Parliament to examine 
ISA 1960 and to minimise its abuses.4 Shortly after the judgement 
of Abdul Ghani Haroon, in May 2001, local human rights groups 
launched the “Abolish ISA Movement” which comprised 82 non-
governmental organisations to pressure for the abolition of ISA 1960. 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York further stifled this “Abolish 
ISA Movement” and gave a good excuse for the government to 
further extend the detention without charge of terrorism suspects 
and non-suspects based on a broad interpretation of the security 
offence in ISA 1960. In three separate sweeps soon after 9/11, the 
government detained militants with alleged links to Kumpulan 
Militan Malaysia (‘KMM’). Twenty-two suspects were also alleged 
to be associated with Jemaah Islamiah (‘JI’), a radical group that 
sought to validate an Islamic Union of Malaysia, Mindanao and 
Indonesia.5 These arrests coincided with the capture of 13 JI militants 
in Singapore.6 Fearing threats from Islamic radicals, usually, the 
citizens were more eager to allow the government to have the power 
to seize and detain whomever it believed was linked to KMM, JI or 
even merely opposition parties. While it is unproven whether some 
of these detainees sought to carry out terrorist acts, 9/11 gave the 
government more political power to exploit the situation.
3 “Operation Lalang Revisited. (2016)”. Aliran.com. Retrieved 5 November 
2016, from http://aliran.com/oldsite/hr/js3.html
4  Abdul Ghani Haroon v Ketua Polis Negara and Anor. (2001) 2 CLJ 709
5 “Malaysia reveals militant link to arrests - January 23, 2002.” Edition.cnn.
com. Retrieved 5 November 2016, from http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/
asiapcf/southeast/01/23/malaysia.muslim.arrest/index.html
6 “Press Releases Singapore Government Press Statement on ISA Arrests,” 11 






Finally, in 2012, the draconian ISA 1960 was finally repealed by 
introducing the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 
(‘SOSMA 2012’). Although SOSMA 2012 was enacted to address 
broad security offences, and not specific terrorism cases per se7 The
controversial indefinite preventive detention without trial like the 
ones in ISA 1960 is no longer available under SOSMA 2012. All 
new security offence detainees caught by the police under this Act 
will be accorded proper trials in the High Court.8 SOSMA dictates 
that a detainee must be brought to the High Court and charged with 
an offence after 28 days of detention. This is in direct contrast with 
ISA 1960, where there was no requirement that a person be charged 
nor tried for any offence. In fact, the Human Rights Commission of 
Malaysia (Suhakam) has lauded the move taken by the government 
to replace the much controversial ISA 1960 with SOSMA 2012.9 
Unfortunately, the advent of POTA 2015 in response to UN 
Resolution 2178 brought the preventive detention regime to the fore 
again which led one of its strong proponents to claim POTA 2015 
was like a twin of ISA.10
Preventive Detention Orders under POTA 2015
Without a doubt, preventive detention is a counter-terrorism tool 
that brings a grave risk of abuse because of the conceptual and 
procedural flaws relating to its practice. While many states felt it is 
a crucial and effective counter-terrorism tool, others have expressed 
7 The preamble of SOSMA 2012 states: “it is necessary to stop action by a 
substantial body of persons both inside and outside Malaysia: 1) to cause, or to 
cause a substantial number of citizens to fear organized violence against persons 
or property; 2) to excite disaffection against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong; 3) 
which is prejudical to public order in, or the security of, the Federation or any 
part thereof; or 4) to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of 
anything by law established.”
8 See Section 12 of SOSMA 2012.
9 “Security Offences Bill a positive step, says Suhakam” - Nation | The Star 
Online. (2012). Retrieved on 5 November 2016, from http://www.thestar.
com.my/news/nation/2012/04/16/security-offences-bill-a-positive-step-says-
suhakam/
10  “Prevention of Terrorism Bill a welcomed conjoined twin to ISA, says Perkasa” 
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certain concerns. For example, the counter-terrorism context of 
preventive detention refers to the future act, which is impossible 
to predict with complete accuracy and presents a risk of detaining 
innocent people.11 The prediction problem is not exclusive to the 
terrorism context, it applies equally to other sources of preventive 
detention powers in Malaysia, especially those preventive detentions 
without charge under the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention 
of Crime) Ordinance 1969 (Emergency Ordinance) (repealed), 
the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive  Measures) Act  1985 
(Dangerous Drugs Act) 12 and the Prevention of Crime Act 1959. 
Under these preventive laws, police can detain suspected gang 
members and criminals who cannot be formally charged owing to 
lack of evidence, and suspected drug traffickers. The preventive 
detention regimes in the two Acts are analogous to the preventive 
detention under POTA 2015. It is observed that the term preventive 
detention has been used by various countries and writers in several 
contexts, as administrative detention,13 investigative detention,14 
pre-charge detention or ministerial detention.15 While there seems 
to be no universally accepted definition of “preventive detention” 
under international law, basically preventive detention regimes can 
be divided into three broad classifications, namely detention under 
the immigration laws, internal security detentions and the pre-trial 
detention. The three categories vary in several aspects, including 
the legal grounds for detention, notice of the framed charges, 
requirement to appear before a regulatory authority, the duration of 
detention, the right to have access to lawyers, the right to a fair and 
11 Cole, D. (2009). Out of the shadows: Preventive detention, suspected terrorists, 
and war. California Law Review, 97(3), 693-750. At p.696.
12 Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969; Dangerous 
Drugs (Special Prevention Measures) Act 1985 (Act 316). The former was 
firstly introduced as a temporary measure to control the spread of violence 
after the May 13, 1969 racial riots, but has since been repealed. The latter was 
introduced with a sunset clause, under which the Act will be reviewed every 
five years. Since 1985, the Act has been successfully renewed from time to 
time.
13 Waxman, M. C. (2009). Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, 
and Detain Whom? Columbia Public Law Research Paper, (08-190), 08-190.
14 Stigall, D. (2009). Counterterrorism and the comparative law of investigative 
detention. Cambria Press.
15 Steven Green, ‘Chapter 2: Preventive Detention and Public Security - Towards 
A General Model’ in Harding, A., & Hatchard, J. (Eds.). (1993). Preventive 




public hearing, judicial review of the detention, and finally, the rules 
on interrogation during detention. Pre-trial detention is, in essence, 
a detention pending police inquiries. The police are empowered to 
detain any terror suspect for inquiries for up to 21 days in Malaysia.16 
Such detentions orders may be made because there are grounds for 
believing the detainee is engaged in the commission or support of 
terrorist acts. 
 
Under POTA 2015, a person may be held without trial for a term 
not exceeding 2 years if the Prevention of Terrorism Board (‘PTB’) 
is satisfied that the detention is needed in the interest of the security 
of Malaysia if the person is engaged in or supports terrorist acts;17 or 
the PTB may issue a restriction order, and the person shall then be 
subjected to police supervision not exceeding a five-year period18 with 
certain conditions to observe. The detention and restriction period can 
be extended if the board determines there are valid grounds and if not, 
it can direct the person to be set free. If the restricted person violates 
the terms of the restriction order, he can be liable to a jail term not 
exceeding ten years and not less than two years.19 No hearing before 
the court of law is given to the terror suspect rather the order is issued 
directly by the PTB. Thus, the executive powers are no longer vested 
with the Home Minister, like in the ISA cases, but it has entrusted 
five members of the PTB with the tasks of determining the culpability 
of the detained person. Unlike in the past, involving ISA cases, the 
police decided whom to detain, but under POTA 2015, only the board 
is allowed to carry out such a decision.
Another significant legal observation here is that, under POTA 
2015, a terrorism offence may not have been done as yet or is not 
accomplished at the point of arrest, but individuals would have 
been detained merely on reasonable suspicion as provided in the 
Act.20 This is termed as ‘inchoate’ offence under criminal law. It is 
further observed that under the Malaysian Penal Code, an individual 
attempt to commit a crime when they cause such an offence to be 
committed and in such an attempt does any act in committing such 
an offence.21 Offences like conspiracy, abetment and instigation 
16 See Section 4 (1)(a) of POTA 2015.
17 See Section 13(1) of POTA 2015.
18 Section 13(3) ibid.
19 Section 13(5) ibid.
20 Section 3(1) ibid.
21 See Section 511 of the Penal Code.
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fall under this group. The rationale behind inchoate offence is to 
prevent a probable crime before it is crystallised–a proactive step in 
crime prevention. The terrorism offences under Chapter VIA of the 
Penal Code share the same sentiment of criminal acts carried out to 
prepare for a terrorist act. However, under POTA 2015, even at the 
formative stages of an action, for example, giving a speech can be 
deemed as an offence of ‘supporting’ although a terrorist act may 
not materialise or has yet to take place. This ‘catch-all’ offence may 
lead to individuals being penalised with detention even before any 
clear criminal intent can be established, bearing in mind there is no 
need for a court of law to establish that element of criminal intent 
under POTA 2015. In tackling terrorism, the Malaysian government 
seems to have preferred to act pre-emptively by capturing people 
before any clear intention to commit the terrorist act is established, 
an approach known as ‘precautionary principle’22 but what is more 
problematic is the sweeping definition outlined in POTA 2015 that 
will give an extensive discretion for the authorities to make an 
arrest. Also, the preamble to POTA 2015 is unclear as to the precise 
circumstances in which the law may be applied and on what basis a 
person may be detained without charge. This is further confounded 
by the vague meaning of phrases like ‘commission’, ‘support’, 
‘involving’ and ‘engaged.’23 Arguably, this may give rise to a person 
being detained without trial beyond the legitimate purposes of the 
Act. An examination of previous security cases brought to court 
showns the Malaysian High Court has pointed out a similar form 
of wide scope and vague context under the former repealed ISA 
1960 whereby a person may be arbitrarily detained for security 
offences. For instance, in the case of Abdul Ghani Haroon v. Ketua 
Polis Negara and Anor, 24 the High Court opined that the phrase 
“prejudicial to the security of Malaysia” is too general and vague 
in nature as found under section 73(1) (b) of the repealed ISA 1960. 
Justice Hishamudin Yunus, in the same case, said:
22 For review of this principle, see Sunstein, C. R. (2005). Laws of fear: Beyond 
the precautionary principle (Vol. 6). Cambridge University Press.
23 The preamble in POTA 2015 provides: “An act to provide for the prevention 
of the commission or support of terrorist acts involving listed terrorist 
organizations in a foreign country or any part of a foreign country and for the 
control of persons engaged in such acts and for related matters”.
24  Abdul Ghani Haroon (ibid) n.4
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“If the arresting officer has reason to believe that the 
applicant (detainee) has acted or is about to act or is 
likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the security of 
Malaysia then the affidavit must state in what manner 
the applicant (detainee) has acted or is about to act or 
is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the security 
of Malaysia. The court is not interested in detailed 
information. Some reasonable amount of particulars 
should be provided for the purpose of satisfying the 
court that there is some basis for the arrest and to 
enable the detainee who believes he is innocent to 
defend himself.” (Emphasis added).
Apparently, with Abdul Ghani Haroon, the Malaysian High Court 
has treated vague statutory provisions with a more restricted scope 
of judicial interpretation in the past when dealing with security laws. 
This was a significant step taken by the Malaysian judiciary, but it is 
uncertain whether the broad language used for detention under the 
POTA 2015 will be read more narrowly like Abdul Ghani Haroon. 
It is important to know that nder POTA 2015, once a suspect is 
apprehended, the evidential burden rests on the suspect to prove that 
the preparatory activity did not progress further to cause a terrorist 
attack so as to avoid being detained by the authority. By shifting the 
burden of proof, it runs contrary to the basic criminal law system 
that everyone charged with a crime shall be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty. The criminalisation of preparatory terrorism offence 
and the shifting of the burden of proof is indeed unfair to the accused 
because a situation can arise when the prosecution holds materials 
that are helpful to the accused but are unwilling to disclose due to 
public interest consideration, especially in security offence cases. 
Hence, the accused’s lawyer cannot conduct a proper defence in a 
trial. It is an indisputable axiom that a person accused of having 
committed a crime should receive a fair trial and, if he cannot be 
tried fairly for that offence, he should not be tried for it at all. The 
right to a fair trial is, therefore, a cardinal requirement of the Rule 
of Law. What must be recognised is that fairness means fairness to 
both sides, not just one. Under criminal law, the procedure followed 
must give a fair opportunity for the prosecutor and the accused to 
prove his case and to the accused to rebut it. However, with the 
advent of POTA 2015, not only the presumption of innocence has 
been compromised, it is also against the principle of natural justice 
on the right to have a fair hearing. 
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Another issue of greater concern is that the period of the preventive 
detention order is not static. Depending on the decision made by 
the PTB, the duration of detention can be reduced to less than two 
years. However, the period of detention may also be renewed by 
the PTB for a further term of two years25 before the expiry each 
time on the same grounds or for reasons different from those on 
which the order was originally made, or partly on the same grounds 
and partly on different grounds.26 The most controversial part of 
extending the detention order is that there is no limit on the number 
of times an order may be extended. Thus, a detention order under 
POTA 2015 can be extended for an unlimited number of two-year 
periods, as long as the PTB decides to do so.27 Perhaps the power to 
impose or renew the detention of a person without limit is equivalent 
to an indefinite term of imprisonment considering the person has 
not been found guilty of any offence, be it major or minor. This 
is viewed as denigrating the principle of the Rule of Law. The 
argument that police needs an indefinite amount of time to remove 
terror threats posed by an individual is a fallacy. Although under 
certain circumstances, it may be acceptable that detention beyond a 
particular fixed period is necessary, such open-ended detention must 
not be adopted arbitrarily. 
There is also another order that can restrict the freedom of movement 
of a person under POTA 2015, although that person is not confined 
in the detention centre. This is termed as a restriction order, and 
such order can be for any period not exceeding five years at a time.28 
A restriction order may prevent a person from being outdoors 
between the times stated in the order; requiring him or her to notify 
the police of his movements at specified times; not to have access 
to the internet unless it is provided in the order, and an electronic 
monitoring device may be attached to him. Similar to the issuing 
and extension of the preventive detention order, a restriction order 
issued can be renewed for a further five years based on the same or 
different grounds, and there is also no limitation on the maximum 
period a restriction order can be extended each time on expiry. The 
restriction order is more like an in-house detention to be applied 
when the police see it as unnecessary to detain a person in a detention 
centre. The punishment for non-compliance of the conditions 
25  Section 17(1) of POTA 2015.
26  Section 17(2) (a)–(c) ibid.
27  Section 17(5) ibid.
28  See Section 13(3) ibid.
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stipulated in the restrictive order can be severe. Any person found to 
have violated the order can be jailed up to maximum of ten years.29 
From the preceding discussion, it can be observed that the detention 
order and its procedures introduced under POTA 2015 have deviated 
from the ordinary criminal law and procedure, especially on matters 
such as the arrest, detention and the required evidentiary burden. 
Such departure from the established principles of criminal law has 
affected individual freedom and rights which are repugnant to the 
Rule of Law principles. 
Legal perspective from other jurisdictions
All governments have a legitimate interest in defending the public 
from any act of terrorism by taking pre-emptive steps to prevent 
them from occurring. However, the problem is that anti-terror law 
is particularly elusive because they circumvent the constitutional 
protection of basic human rights. As highlighted, Malaysia’s anti-
terror law model is premised on pre-emptive rather than punitive 
nature under the ordinary criminal law system. An individual’s 
freedom can be restricted merely by reasonable suspicion which 
is repugnant to the concept of the Rule of Law values. Other 
democratic nations like India and the United Kingdom have their 
own respective anti-terror laws too, and they have confronted many 
challenges in upholding the Rule of Law values, in particular, the 
curtailment of one’s basic rights. 
India
Section 57 of India’s Criminal Procedure Code 1973 (‘CrPC 
1973’) dictates that in the absence of a court order issued by a 
Magistrate, a suspect caught without a proper warrant is to be 
released immediately.30 However, India’s anti-terror laws such as the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA 2002) (repealed) and the 
current Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 (‘UAPA 1967’), 
29 Section 13 (5) ibid.
30 Section 57 CrPC provides: “Person arrested not to be detained more than 
twenty- four hours. No police officer shall detain in custody a person arrested 
without warrant for a longer period than under all the circumstances of the 
case is reasonable, and such period shall not, in the absence of a special order 
of a Magistrate under section 167, exceed twenty- four hours exclusive of the 
time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’ s 
Court”
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allow up to 180 days31 of detention by disregarding the application 
of Section 57. The controversial detention provisions as laid down in 
India’s anti-terror laws, not only conflict with Section 57 of the CrPC, 
it also runs contrary to protection against unreasonable detention. 
Article 22 of the Indian Constitution 1949 32 provides the safeguard 
on arbitrary detention. Article 22(7) puts forward the proposition 
that the preventive detentions as applied in India are the instances 
of exceptions given by the Indian Parliament.33 The Terrorist and 
31  Section 49(2) (b) of Indian POTA 2002; Section 43D (2) (b) of UAPA 1967
32  Article 22 of the Constitution of India covers the safeguards against arrest and 
detention.
(1) “No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being 
informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be 
denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his 
choice. (2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be 
produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours 
of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of 
arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained 
in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. (3) 
Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply (a) to any person who for the time 
being is an enemy alien; or (b) to any person who is arrested or detained 
under any law providing for preventive detention.
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of 
a person for a period longer than three months unless:- (a) an Advisory 
Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to 
be appointed nothing in this sub–clause shall authorise the detention of 
any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by 
Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or (b) such person is detained 
in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under 
sub–clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law 
providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, 
as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which 
the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of 
making a representation against the order.
(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as 
is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers 
to be against the public interest to disclose.”
33 Article 22(7) states that: “Parliament may by law prescribe (a) the circumstances 
under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be 
detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for 
preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in 
accordance with the provisions of sub–clause (a) of clause (4);(b) the maximum 
period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained 
under any law providing for preventive detention; and (c) the procedure to be 




Disruptive Activities, 1987 (‘TADA 1987’)34 provided the extended 
periods of detention of terror suspects in India pending investigation. 
It was applied even after TADA’s repeal and continued to be adopted 
and enforced until POTA 200235 was repealed. This has dramatically 
changed the provision under Section 167(2) of the CrPC 1973.The 
section outlines the procedure to be followed in instances whenever 
the police officers failed to conclude their investigation within the 
time span of twenty hours allowed. Under such situations, it allows 
further detention for a particular number of days on complying with 
certain requirements.36
In the case of Mulund Railway Blasts,37 the Indian Supreme Court 
attempted to strike a balance regarding the liberties of the accused 
person charged in court against the national security concerns in 
arriving at a conclusion of the case. In cases of offenders of grave 
offences like those arrested under the provisions of TADA 1987 and 
POTA 2002, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that some leeway 
should be accorded to the investigating machinery to complete their 
investigation by extending the time needed. However, this extension 
was not to be given automatically provided the conditions listed in 
34 See: Section 20(4) TADA 1987
35 Section 49(2) POTA 2002 
36 Section 167(2) CrPC states: “The Magistrate to whom an accused person 
is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has no jurisdiction 
to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in 
such custody as Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days on 
the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, 
and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be 
forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: provided that – 
(a)  the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, 
otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen 
days; if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no 
Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody 
under this paragraph for a total period exceeding,
(i)  ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with 
death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten 
years;
(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the 
expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, 
the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does 
furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub- section shall 
be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the 
purposes of that Chapter”.
37  (2005) 7 SCC 29 (the Mulund Railway Blast case).
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the Act38 are complied with. Save for all the listed conditions being 
fulfilled by the authority upon their application in court, the court 
should reject the extension of the accused’s detention period applied 
by the authority.39 The Court remarked:
‘The report of the Public Prosecutor must satisfy 
the Court that the Investigating Agency had acted 
diligently and though there had been progress in the 
investigation, it was not possible for reasons disclosed 
to complete the investigation within the period of 90 
days. In such cases, having regard to the progress of 
the investigation and the specific reason for the grant 
of extension of time, the Court may extend the period 
for completion of the investigation, thereby enabling 
the Court to remand the accused to custody during 
the extended period. These are compulsions which 
arise in extraordinary situations. […] It is only with 
great difficulty that the investigating agency is able to 
unearth the well planned and deep-rooted conspiracy 
involving a large number of persons functioning from 
different places. It is even more difficult to apprehend 
the members of the conspiracy. The investigation is 
further delayed on account of the reluctance on the 
part of the witnesses to depose in such cases. It is only 
after giving them full assurance of safety that the police 
is able to obtain their statements. Thus, while law 
enjoins upon the investigating agency an obligation to 
conduct the investigation with a sense of urgency and 
with promptitude, there are cases in which the period 
38 The conditions under section 49(2) (b) POTA 2002 states: “after the proviso, 
the following provisos shall be inserted, namely “Provided further that if it is 
not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, 
the Special Court shall extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty 
days, on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the 
investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond 
the said period of ninety days, provided also that if the police officer making 
the investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes of investigation, for 
police custody from judicial custody of any person from judicial custody, he 
shall file an affidavit stating the reasons for doing so and shall also explain the 
delay, if any, for requesting such police custody.”
39 ibid, n.36 para 12.
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of 90 days may not be sufficient for the purpose. Hence, 
the legislature, subject to certain safeguards, has 
empowered the Court concerned to extend the period 
for the completion of the investigation and to remand 
the accused to custody during the extended period.’ 40
In the Mulund Railway Blast case, it was also contended by the 
accused that he had not been given sufficient notice of the application 
moved under the first proviso to Section 49(2) (b) of the POTA 
2002.41 Although there is no statutory requirement to give any notice 
to the appellant in any specific form, the judge opined that even if 
there was no specific provision to this effect, fair play and principles 
of natural justice demand that before granting the authority to extend 
time to complete their investigation, the court must give notice to the 
accused should the accused wishes to oppose the said application. 
However, by bringing the accused to the court during the request for 
an extension of time to conclude the police investigation is sufficient 
for the purpose of notification of the intended application. Thus, the 
prerequisite of notification was required to be interpreted into the 
law that touches on the fairness and the principles of natural justice 
as decided by the Supreme Court decision in the case called Sanjay 
Dutt v State through CBI, Bombay 42 which was cited in the Mulund 
Railway Blasts case with approval.
When POTA 2002 was repealed, the pre-trial detention under Section 
49(2) was not abolished. In fact, when UAPA 1967 was amended 
in 2008, Section 43D (2) 43 was similar to section 49(2) of POTA 
40 ibid, n.36 para 13.  
41 See section 49(2)(b) POTA 2002 (supra) n.37.
42 (1994) 5 SCC 410 see para. 3.
43 In the sub-section (2) it states: “Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to 
a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modification 
that in sub-section (2),
(a) the references to fifteen days, ninety days and sixty days, wherever they 
occur, shall be construed as references to thirty days, ninety days and ninety 
days respectively; and
(b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be inserted, namely: -
 Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation 
within the said period of ninety days, the Court may if it is satisfied with the 
report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation 
and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said 
period of ninety days, extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty 
days: Provided also that if the police officer making the investigation under 
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2002. Even though the amended UAPA 1967 removed the provisions 
pertaining to confessions made while in police custody, unfortunately, 
the 2008 amendments brought back many of the old provisions under 
POTA 2002.44  However, the good part of it was the strict criteria for 
discharging a suspected person taken into custody over 180 days under 
Section 43D (2) of UAPA 1967 received considerable attention by the 
Indian High Courts in some of the cases brought before them.45 The 
accused can no longer be kept indefinitely. If the accused furnishes bail, 
he must be released when the investigation is unable to finish within the 
time-frame allowed. Under Section 43D (2) of UAPA 1967, the merits 
of the case are immaterial to justify further extension of the detention 
period. It is observed that the court in arriving at these conclusions had 
turned to the court’s decision on Section 167(2) of CrPC.46 The decided 
cases ignored the Explanation I in Section 167(2) of CrPC, which 
provides that irrespective of the expiration of the 60/90 days time-frame 
allowed (and in UAPA 90 /180 days), an accused person will be kept in 
custody if the accused person is unable to provide any bail. Although the 
court has moved in the right direction to shorten the length of detention 
of those who provide bail, it did not help those accused persons who are 
destitute or fail to meet the bail conditions. For example, the requirement 
of sureties will make the destitute helpless and continue to languish in 
jail. Thus, there is still no protection in UAPA 1967 for these people to 
be discharged on bail. On another note, if an accused person exercised 
his rights under Section 43D (2) of UAPA 1967 for statutory bail, but 
the accused custody was found to be illegal, the Indian Supreme Court 
has pronounced that if there was any request for extension of time 
for investigation being made in court later, the duration of detention 
could not be extended retrospectively. Otherwise, it will defeat the 
accused’s legal right that arises on the expiry of the 90– day period.47 
this Act, requests, for the purposes of investigation, for police custody from 
judicial custody of any person in judicial custody, he shall file an affidavit 
stating the reasons for doing so and shall also explain the delay, if any, for 
requesting such police custody.”
44 “Dhawan R; India’s Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA): The Return of 
POTA & TADA” - Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières. (2008). Europe-solidaire.
org. Retrieved from http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article15177
45 Cases such as BK Lala v Chhattisgarh, (2012) Cri LJ 1629 para 17, Mohd. 
Maroof @ Ibrahim & Ors v State (12 May 2015) Delhi High Court
46 See cases like “Rajnikant Jivanlal v Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control 
Bureau, New Delhi, (1989) 3 SCC 532; Union of India v Thamisharasi,” (1995) 
4 SCC 190.  
47 See “Sayed Mohd. Ahmed Kazmi v State, GNCTD & Ors” (2012) 12 SCC 1, 
para 25.  
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In India, as pointed out, the difficulty of getting bail upon arrest 
is the most sinister form of deviation from the criminal procedural 
norm. As highlighted earlier, within 24 hours after arrest, an accused 
person ought to be brought before the magistrate court under their 
ordinary criminal procedure laws. Unless it appears to the presiding 
Magistrate that the investigation cannot be accomplished within the 
24– hour’ time-frame, the magistrate must discharge the accused on 
bail. During this preliminary stage, even though bail is not applicable 
outright in some serious non-bailable offences such as murder, such 
procedural rule is intended to be obeyed and 16 not an excuse not 
to grant bail. Within the 90 days, if no charge sheet is registered 
against the accused person, bail is ready as of right to the accused.48 
Unfortunately, UAPA 1967 extends the duration up to 180 days, of 
which there is a possibility of the accused person being kept for 
30 days under police custody while under investigation. In some 
cases, however, if a report submitted by the public prosecutor shows 
the progress of the investigation or a prima facie case is shown, the 
court may increase the duration to another 90 days if it is satisfied 
the investigation cannot be completed on time. Another striking 
feature of the UAPA 1967 is the denial of bail for illegal immigrants 
found in India who are apprehended for offences committed 
under the provisions of this anti-terror law. Hence, refusal of bail 
for immigrants under UAPA 1967 provisions called into question 
India’s counter-terror measures as being undemocratic. Past 
practices in enforcing TADA 1987 and POTA 2002, have shown 
similar provisions where many detainees under such anti-terror laws 
were held in pre-trial detention for an indefinite period although 
there are ostensible safeguards prescribed under Article 22 of the 
Indian Constitution.
The United Kingdom (UK)
The UK government experiences a rich historical past in tackling 
acts of terrorism by using legislation. In the UK, detention without 
charge has been around before 9/11 and has been applied against IRA 
in the Northern Ireland for decades. The impact of 9/11 prompted 
48  Section 167 of CrPC.
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the UK Parliament to quickly introduce another anti-terror law 
known as the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA 
2001) which came into force on 14 December 2001.49 The most 
controversial provision in ATCSA 2001 has been the broad executive 
power granted to the Home Secretary to detain foreigners suspected 
to be engaged in terrorism activities without charge.50 Webber 51 
reported that from 2006 until the end of 2011 saw the duration of the 
detention period without charge being raised to twenty-eight days for 
those who were arrested for terrorism acts. In 2014, forty-four out of 
sixty-five persons detained under terror legislation were dealt within 
seven days. Besides detention without charge, the UK government’s 
counter-terrorism strategy entails the implementation of control 
orders (now abolished) under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
(PTA 2005). Due to the controversial nature of the order, finally, the 
control order was substituted with another measure known as the 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIM).
Before the start of the control orders under PTA 2005, the House 
of Lords, in the case known as ‘Belmarsh’,  made a decision that 
the power to indefinitely detain foreigners thought to be a threat to 
national security and to detain them without trial under Part IV of 
ATCSA 2001 was inconsistent with the provisions in the ECHR.52 
It was decided the detention powers granted in ATCSA 2001 were 
prejudicial against the foreigners caught under this Act. Besides, 
it was disproportionate to the extent of the threat posed by these 
foreigners. In just three months after the courts decision in Belmarsh, 
the UK government enacted PTA 2005 in March 2005.The new Act 
was supposed to provide an alternative to the unlawful detention 
found in ATCSA 2001 with a two-layered control order.53 Essentially, 
a control order was issued to a person by imposing obligations such 
as curfews to prohibit or restrict that individual from engaging in 
terrorism-related activities.  The court, in Secretary of State for the 
49 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. (2017). Legislation.gov.uk. 
Retrieved 8 January 2017 from http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/
introduction/enacted
50  A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004) UKHL 56 
(The Belmarsh case).
51 Webber, D. (2016). Preventive Detention of Terror Suspects: A New Legal 
Framework. Routledge.
52 See the Belmarsh case.
53 See Section 2 and 4 of PTA 2005.
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Home Department v MB 54 laid down the test for imposing a control 
order as follows:
“Whether it is necessary to impose any particular 
obligation on an individual in order to protect 
the public from the risk of terrorism involves the 
customary test of proportionality. The object of 
the obligations is to control the activities of the 
individual so as to reduce the risk that he will take 
part in any terrorism-related activity.”
Unlike the early counter-terror measures in the form of preventive 
detention without charge as applied in the Belmarsh, control orders 
are not restricted to foreigners only. The government viewed the 
control orders as a tool to stop and interrupt those terror suspects 
whom the government thought cannot be charged nor deported 
for lack of evidence. So, the objective of the control orders is to 
safeguard the overall populace from the threat pertaining to acts of 
terrorism by imposing burdens on these suspects who are believed 
to be engaged in terrorism activities (though without strong proof). 
Such an order is to control or prohibit these individuals from taking 
part in some terror activities. Control orders are theoretically civil 
procedures, even though a violation of such imposed responsibility 
by the suspect creates an unlawful offence which can be jailed up 
to a maximum of five years. A judge gives the control orders at the 
behest of the Secretary of State. In the application for the issuance 
of a non-derogating order in court, the onus of proof in court is not 
the same as the usual civil standard “on the balance of probability”, 
but on a lower standard of “reasonable ground for suspicion” only.55 
What it means here is under Section 2(1) (a) of PTA 2005 there 
are two limbs to be satisfied. The Secretary of State must have 
“reasonable grounds” for alleging the individual concerned is or has 
been engaged in terror activities before issuing the non-derogating 
orders. Unlike the derogating order under Section 4(7) (a) of PTA 
2005, the court must be satisfied on the ‘balance of probabilities’ 
that the controlled person is or has been engaged in terror activities. 
54 [2006] EWCA Civ. 1140.
55 Donkin, S. (2013). “Preventing terrorism and controlling risk: A comparative 
analysis of control orders in the UK and Australia” (Vol. 1). Springer Science 
& Business Media.
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Arguably, the lesser threshold required under Section 2(1) (a) of PTA 
2005 will be of great advantage to the UK government whenever 
a control order is sought from the court. Due to its controversial 
features at its inception, subsequently, in December 2011, the control 
order system was repealed and succeeded by TPIM.
In essence, PTA 2005 envisaged two distinct kinds of a control 
order. They are classified as the derogating and the non-derogating 
order as highlighted above. The derogating control order would be 
ones that are considered to disrupt the freedom and rights of the 
controlled person to such an extent that a derogation from Article 5 
of ECHR would be required, while the non-derogating control order 
it is the permissible control order issued under the provision of PTA 
2005.56 In short, the difference by derogation is referred to the UK’s 
commitments as a member state of ECHR before this (Pre-Brexit), 
wherein Article 5 forbids the detention of a person without having 
the due process of law. Before a control order can be issued out, 
regardless of whether derogation or non-derogation, the Secretary 
of State has to communicate with the police officers first to figure 
out if indeed there is adequate proof against a suspected person for 
reasons of mounting a criminal prosecution.57Through the duration 
of the control order, the suspected person’s conduct will be regularly 
monitored by the police officers with a view of possible prosecution 
later on.58 However, according to past records, the UK government 
has only issued non-derogating orders.59Therefore, it can be argued 
that a non-derogating control order can seriously limit a person’s 
freedom by setting a variety of terms on a person believed to be 
taking part in terrorism activities. Section 1(3) PTA 2005 states:
“The obligations that may be imposed by a control 
order made against an individual are any obligations 
that the Secretary of State or (as the case may be) the 
court considers necessary for purposes connected with 
preventing or restricting involvement by that individual 
in terrorism-related activity.”
56  Ibid. 
57  Section 8(2) PTA 2005.
58  Section 8(4) ibid.
59  Donkin, S op cit. n 7.
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The obligations referred to in Section 1(3) above connotes limiting 
the freedom of movements. Further, the suspect may be compelled 
to wear an electronically monitored device at the Secretary of 
State’s assessment of each case. A terrorism-related activity is not 
merely restricted to the offence of the commission, preparation or 
instigation,60 but any behaviour in aiding or supporting including 
helping any suspected persons who are associated with any terrorist 
activity.61 Examples of such offences include writing, publishing 
or publishing material glorifying terrorism, openly promoting or 
speaking, and motivating others to commit terror acts.62
Before the repeal of PTA 2005, a non-derogating control order can 
be in force for twelve months and could be extended for the duration 
for which the Secretary of State believed as 2(1) still applied.63 Once 
a non-derogating order was granted, it has to be agreed to by a Judge 
of the High Court within seven days.64 The court’s role was to decide 
if the recommendations brought forward by the Secretary of State 
were flawed.65  If it held the proposal forwarded was workable, a 
proceeding had to be set up. However, the suspected person could not 
be in court as the application was made via ex parte, nor be informed 
of the petition, nor provided with the opportunity to defend himself.66 
If the court found faults in the Secretary of State’s argument, or in 
the obligations recommended, the order or that specific obligation 
had to be set aside, or else, the order had to be approved.67 Once 
approved, the individual in question will be conveyed the order 
issued against him.68 What tantamounts to defects in the Secretary 
of State’s application in court, as PTA 2005 pointed out are that the 
60 Section 1(9) a ibid.
61 Section 1(9) b – d ibid.
62 After the enactment of PTA in 2005, Terrorism Act 2006 (TA 2006) was 
introduced to amend the control order regime in PTA 2005. TA 2006 made new 
preparatory terrorism offences such as “encouragement of terrorism (sec 1), 
dissemination of terrorist publications (sec 2), preparation of terrorist acts (sec 
5) and training for terrorism (sec 6).” These new offences allowed individuals 
who might otherwise have been subjected to a control order to be charged in 
court.
63 See section 2(4) and (6) PTA 2005.
64 Section 3(1) a and 3 (4) ibid.
65 Section 3(2) a ibid.
66 Section 3(5)(a), (b) and (c).
67 Section 3(6) ibid.
68 Section 3(9) ibid.
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concepts applicable on any typical judicial review would be used,69 
that is Diplock Trilogy70 on illegality, procedural impropriety and 
irrationality. Executive powers can be set aside by the court if they 
have breached fundamental rights such as the due process in any 
case being brought before the court. Additionally, the original non-
derogating control order could be amended, both at the suggestion 
of the suspected person or the Secretary of State.71 Interestingly also, 
Section 2(9) outlined that all the obligations to be imposed do not 
necessarily have to be related to the offence for which the suspected 
person was caught initially. Effectively, this is giving the Secretary 
of State complete discretion to enforce more constraints. Although 
the control order was a civil measure imposed by the authority, an 
important that point needs to the highlighted here is any violation 
of the commitment by the suspected person in the said order is 
vulnerable to criminal prosecution.72 
In the wake of criticism on control orders, a revised form of control 
order regime was subsequently introduced in 2012.73 The new 
scheme was meant to be more flexible and focused on less stringent 
conditions than those found in the control orders,74 but critics say it 
was little more than “control orders lite.”75 The earlier control orders 
regime introduced through PTA 2005 were more constraining as 
terror suspects were subjected to relocation to another district away 
from their original places of abode and would also be placed under 
16-hour curfews. Suspects can also be prevented from mixing with 
certain named people, using mobile phones or the internet. Under the 
new TPIMs, the suspects can be tagged electronically with devices 
and made to report regularly to the police. Thus, TPIMs relate more 
closely to current civil law restrictions. The aim of the measures is 
to have a defensive effect by interrupting the terror suspects’ plans 
69 Section 3(11) b ibid.
70 See “Bonner, D. (2006). Checking the executive? Detention without trial, 
control orders, due process and human rights. European Public Law,” 12(1), 
45-71.
71 Section 7(1) PTA 2005.
72 Section 9(1) stated: “A person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes an 
obligation imposed on him by a control order is guilty of an offence.”
73 See: Section 1 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 
2011 (Chap 23).
74 Schedule 1 Part 1 ibid.




or to alleviate police investigation. Henceforth, police officers will 
have a legal responsibility to ensure that the suspect’s behaviour is 
held under regular check with the hope of bringing a criminal charge 
later on against the suspect. TPIMs are imposed by notice to the 
Secretary of State who must inter-alia be satisfied with the balance 
of probabilities76 that the suspect is or has been engaged in terrorism 
acts and thus, it is crucial to use any of the wide range of measures 
to safeguard the citizens from the danger of terror attacks.77 TPIMs 
may not exceed two years,78 but the Secretary of State must keep 
under review whether it is necessary to continue the measures.79 
Permission from the High Court must be sought before the measures 
can be imposed.80 After permission is given, and the suspect is served 
with the notice detailing the measures, the High Court conducts a 
review hearing as soon as it is reasonably practical.81 There is a right 
to appeal against any decision to vary or extend the notice, or any 
refusal to vary or discharge the notice.82 Besides judicial scrutiny, 
the Secretary of State must issue a quarterly report.83 The Secretary 
of State’s TPIM powers is only valid for five years.84 Having 
considered the different preventive detention regimes above, this 
article can affirm that the UK’s preventive detention framework 
has a dual-purpose approach. It permits detention for investigation 
and facilitate decisions about whether to charge a terror suspect 
ultimately. It also permits preventive detention of terror suspects 
without charge for up to fourteen days. Thus, the UK wields a delicate 
balance between security and liberty. When faced with significant 
actual threats and attacks, the government tilts the security side of 
the scale as far as it can. When prompted by the courts, the UK has 
retreated and responded to the findings of human rights violations 
by changing its laws quickly. For example, discriminating between 
local citizens and foreigners regarding the length of detention periods 
resulted in the repeal of ATCSA 2001. When the length of curfews 
76 The evidential standard of “reasonable ground” under Section 3(1) of TPIM Act 
was amended by Section 20(1) of CTSA 2015 to “balance of probabilities”.
77 Section 2(2) TPIM Act 2011.
78 Section 5 ibid.
79 Section 11 ibid.
80 Section 6 - 9 ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Section 16 ibid.
83 Section 19 ibid.
84 Section 21 ibid.
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under control orders reached eighteen hours, and ECHR considered 
that period amounted to a deprivation of liberty,85 the government 
pulled back and reduced the curfew to sixteen hours. Unlike other 
comparable jurisdictions in this study, at least the UK government 
listened to the complaints about control orders and replaced them 
with TPIMs. Now, under Section 6 of TPIM, a court will scrutinise 
any application by the Secretary of State before any measures 
can be imposed on any person. In contrast with POTA 2015, PTB 
established under the Act,86 decides on issuing the detention orders 
on any suspected person without the legal scrutiny of the court. 
Hence, the discretionary powers conferred on the PTB appears to 
be broad as any decision made is not reviewable by the court.87 
Meanwhile, in India, many legal challenges have been mounted in 
court to test the validity of their anti-terror law provisions against the 
constitution regarding fundamental rights protection ranging from 
arrest, bail and detention as discussed in the preceding paragraphs 
above. Therefore, it is observed that at least, in India and the UK, 
the courts were given the opportune time to examine if any aspects 
of the anti-terror provisions have degraded the Rule of Law values 
unlike Malaysia’s POTA 2015. 
Another noteworthy observation is the unique source of the legal 
power from where the security laws or the emergency powers are 
derived for the three states. In a system of government based on 
constitutional supremacy such as Malaysia and India, the emergency 
powers to pass an emergency law such as POTA 2015 affecting the 
safety of Malaysians can be traced to Article 14988 of the Federal 
Constitution. For India, Article 35289 of the Constitution empowered 
the President of India, as the head of the executive branch, to 
proclaim a state of emergency and bestow the government with 
85 SS for Home Dept. v. JJ & others [2007] UKHL 45.
86 Section 8 of POTA 2015.
87 Section 19 (ibid).
88 In Part XI of the Federal Constitution, Article 149 empowers the Parliament to 
legislate against subversion, action prejudicial to public order, etc. 
89 Article 352 (1) states: “If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency 
exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is 
threatened, whether by war or external aggression or armed rebellion, he 
may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect in respect of the whole 




the extraordinary power to make laws90 such as preventive security 
laws. As observed in this article, the apparent constitutional rights 
to enact emergency security laws seem to work paradoxically with 
other fundamental rights to liberty and freedom as enshrined in the 
constitutional framework and therefore, are perceived as repugnant 
to the Rule of Law values. However, in Malaysia and India, the 
judiciary is obligated to protect, defend and preserve the sanctity 
of the Constitution at all cost. In contrast to the parliamentary 
supremacy regime practised by the UK government, the public 
would have no recourse when the majority of the parliamentarians 
made new emergency laws such as ATCSA 2001 that curtail 
personal liberty rights as there are no checks and balances on the 
mighty Parliament under such a system. Therefore, English judges 
cannot simply strike down legislation even if the UK Parliament 
enacts unjust laws that infringe fundamental human rights. The UK 
Law Lords may just state it is the policy of the government and that 
they are not prepared to interfere. Such an approach taken by the 
UK courts is an acceptable norm and justified under the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy.
Concluding remarks
The nature of contemporary terrorism requires an emphasis on 
building a robust counter-terrorism strategy rather than the adoption of 
the eactive or deterrence-based approach under the ordinary criminal 
justice system. As a result, preventive detention has been regarded 
as one of the most effective tools in the counter-terrorism strategy 
in Malaysia, India and the UK. Although the preventive detention 
regime undermines human rights and disrespects the ideals of the 
Rule of Law such as arbitrary arrests without providing the ground for 
arrest and detention, Malaysia’s security-based laws like ISA 1960 
(repealed), SOSMA 2012 and the recent POTA 2015 show that the 
Acts should keep Malaysia safe from the threat to national security 
in times of real emergency. However, the Malaysian government 
has often resorted to the practice of using preventive detention 
measures to suppress political dissent and human rights activities in 
the past. Although various security-based legislations empower the 
law enforcement officials to investigate and detain terror suspects, 
90 See: For e.g. Article 353 (b).
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the long-arm of the law has stretched as far as hauling up political 
opponents, including leaders of non-government organisations. The 
Malaysian government also saw mass demonstrations and other 
kinds of political activity as potentially undermining the interest of 
national security; for instance, the arrest of Bersih 2.0 leader under 
SOSMA 201291 recently.
By looking at Malaysia’s detention without charge regimes against 
other jurisdictions like those in India and the UK, the preventive 
detention provision by itself is problematic. For instance, the two-
year period of preventive detention (which can be extended) under 
POTA 2015 is not only disproportionate to the objective of the 
regime but also against the principles of natural justice and the Rule 
of Law. In fact, the security-based laws passed in Malaysia and the 
countries studied, the courts did sometimes attempt to support the 
integrity of the constitutions or safeguard the constitutional rights 
and freedoms. This can be seen in Abdul Ghani Haroon in Malaysia, 
the AF in the UK and the Mulund Railway case in India. 
It is to be noted that in Malaysia, there is no mechanism for 
independent oversight of preventive detention laws. The idea of 
having a safeguard mechanism is to check on the operation of the 
preventive detention legal framework and its measures. Therefore, 
it is recommended that an independent designated person or body 
monitor and report annually on the effectiveness of preventive 
detention measures under POTA 2015 and recommend proper 
measures or the abolition of any weak measures Based on the report 
and findings submitted, the government should take cognisance 
and respond within the time period and if necessary, to introduce 
changes to the detention laws if proper. Although in Malaysia and 
India, there is no independent oversight of the operation of terrorism 
legislation, it is imperative to have it in the UK, and this measure 
should be codified under Section 36 of the Terrorism Act 2006.92 The 
UK’s example could serve as a model for the Malaysian government 
91 The Malaysian Bar - Press Release | “SOSMA Must Not Be Abused to Quell 
Dissent.” Malaysianbar.org.my. Retrieved from http://www.malaysianbar.org.
my/press_statements/press_release_%7C_sosma_must_not_be_abused_to_
quell_dissent.html
92 Section 36 of Terrorism Act, 2006 provides for a review of terrorism legislation 




to have a proper and proportionate exercise of preventive detention 
powers. In sum, this article concludes that anti-terror legislations 
do not adhere to the principles of the Rule of Law strictly when 
safeguarding national security. Instead, it has degraded the Rule of 
Law values. 
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